recently started to take hold in the annals of what is now referred to as "international law" 14 and has become more significant after groundbreaking international conventions held around the turn of the 20 th century 15 and the commissions and criminal tribunals established following the World Wars. 16 In fact, some scholars have said that international law is built upon the very idea of "applying legal rules and standards to the complex and chaotic backdrop of contemporary armed conflicts and episodes of mass atrocity [in] a bold -some would say futile -effort to fix individual responsibility for history's violent march." 17 As the events of the world unfold, the realm of international law and its criminal statutes follow as a restraint on those who overstep the bounds of state sovereignty and fundamental human decency in ways that surpass any national legal system's authority or ability to bring about retributive justice.
A recent trend on the world stage is the trial and punishment for genocide as a crime under international criminal statutes. While the crime had been committed throughout the centuries, it was not formally defined until legal scholar
Raphael Lemkin did so in 1944, 18 and not internationally codified until the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 19 came into effect in 1951. 20 This Convention finally gave "the basis for the emergence of a norm of customary international law, with the force of jus cogens, which renders genocide punishable [and] subject to universal jurisdiction." 21 Continuing this trend, the United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in May of 1993. 22 And while this tribunal held the promise of being the first international legal body with jurisdiction over genocide as a crime 23 and opened a new era in modern international criminal law and the prevention and punishment of genocide, the road to conviction has not been a smooth one.
Until the 1990's there were very few prosecutions for the crime in any legal systems, and when such instances arose, the Genocide Convention's definition proved vague and controversial. 24 Even in current trials involving genocide, the lacunae inherent in the definition leave the crime subject to disparaging interpretations and calls for statutory reform. . 24 See Ratner and Abrams, supra note 12 at 26 25 These jurisprudential conflicts are often compounded by doctrinal controversies in tribunal statutes 26 and ambiguities in the customary international law. 27 This paper focuses on these doctrinal controversies and examines how genocide is and has been addressed by modern tribunals, with special emphasis on the subjective mens rea (mental element) required for genocide. I contend that these doctrinal controversies and statutory ambiguities leave the door open for prosecutorial strategies that fatally undermine tribunal fairness and sound jurisprudence. Since there are nebulous terms in genocide statutes and since statutes do not fully elaborate, many ways of interpretation are theoretically possible. This can cause discrepancies when genocide is applied in practice, especially in relation to the proof required to show genocidal mens rea.
I also contend that as charges of genocide are presented more frequently at trial, its scope is being enlarged -especially as it relates to superior liability and joint criminal enterprise. The primary research method for this paper is an examination of legal research and ad hoc tribunal judgments along with interviews of tribunal personnel.
II -Genocide as a Crime Under International Law
By the turn of the twentieth century, the international community was beginning to solidify a growing feeling of moral duty -nations began to come together and recognize the need to protect all of the world's citizens from the "abuses of states." 28 The results of this moral alliance included the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907, the latter of which specified that "the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized people, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience." 29 This was a key step in the formulation of international laws that continued throughout the 20 th century, but was not the first. Countries such as France, Great Britain, and the United States had long held to a belief of a right to intervene on behalf of persecuted minorities, and had done so in Eastern Europe, Russia, Turkey, and Latin America. 30 As the time of "the War to end all Wars" approached, protecting innocents in times of conflict was a timehonored and respected tradition. 1.) dolus directus (direct intent), where the consequences of an action were both foreseen and desired by the perpetrator. Here, a perpetrator desires the death of a victim and foresees that a certain act will bring about the death of the victim; 2.) dolus indirectus (indirect intent), where secondary consequences in addition to those desired by a perpetrator of an act were foreseen by the perpetrator as a certain result, although the perpetrator did not specifically desire these secondary consequences, he still committed the act with knowledge of them; and 3.) dolus eventualis, where a perpetrator foresees consequences other than those directly desired as a possibility, and not necessarily a certainty, but nevertheless proceeds with a criminal act.
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Understandably, various national legal systems have different views on these intent standards. As noted genocide scholar William Schabas explains, "The dolus specialis concept is particular to a few civil law systems and cannot sweepingly be equated with the notions of 'special' or 'specific intent' in common law systems. Of course, the same might equally be said of the concept of 'specific intent,' a notion used in the common law almost exclusively within the context of the defense of voluntary intoxication."
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In common law legal systems, the exact mental requirement and mens rea standard may vary from crime to crime, but generally the more serious crimes require a more strict intent requirement, while less serious crimes may require a "less culpable state of mind" 54 -simple negligence for manslaughter charges or no mental requirement for automobile speeding tickets, for example.
Civil law has different interpretations of intent. Under French law, the meaning of "intent" has cause some confusion since French courts have applied both strict concepts like dolus directus, as well as a more loosely defined concept of dol general, which is understood to mean "the conscious and voluntary action to violate the law." German law defines some crimes in terms of a deliberate desire to achieve predetermined consequences, but deals with criminal intent as a whole in terms of an acceptance of or willingness to realize possible criminal consequences. Furthermore, in 49 The crime of persecution, while it does require acts directed at a group because of group membership, it does not require the accused to intend to "destroy [the group] in whole or in part." See also Jelesic Judgement, para. 68 at www. Thus, the meaning of "intent" can be ambiguous, and genocide statutes were authored by an international assemblage of representatives from countries with different penal codes, legal systems, and philosophies. The United Nations in particular is a mix of countries with different legal systems whose practices and interpretations may even contradict each other -common law systems often disagree with continental (civil) law systems about legal reasoning, trial procedures, and precedent. In addition, the UN is a political, not a legal, organization at the mercy of "political forces, pressure groups and blocs, in an arena where delegates pursue the divisive interests of the states they represent." The preferred interpretation among jurists and legal scholars dictates that genocide is a crime of specific or special intent, where a perpetrator targets victims especially on the basis of their group membership and has a distinct desire to cause the destruction of the group itself. 57 The trial chambers of the ICTY and ICTR seem to prefer this type of a definition since the terms dolus specialis and "special intent" have been used in judgments to describe the mens rea of genocide. 58 This is not surprising since that definition most closely corresponds with the sentiments expressed by Raphael
Lemkin in his creation of the first genocide definition.
The idea of dolus specialis however, is still fairly ambiguous. Some scholars have said it should be equated directly with dolus directus because both concepts require a perpetrator to have the will to bring about genocidal consequences and a specific desire to do so. 59 This would seem logical since the idea of "specific" intent connotes the idea of the direct discriminatory desire of dolus directus and "special" intent connotes the idea that the intent standard is one that is more narrowly focused. In spite of this, another line of reasoning exists about the components of genocidal intent that takes into account the ICC's attempts at elaborating on the concept. In ICC statutes, "intent" is defined as a "person means to cause [the] consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events." 60 This would seem to imply that genocidal intent includes both dolus directus and dolus indirectus (through the use of the phrase "is 55 See Greenawalt, supra note 51 at 2266-2270 for a discussion of how various national systems define, or attempt to define, criminal intent. Here these systems are contrasted with the MPC of the United States and the question is raised as to whether "intent" has a special meaning within the context of genocide statutes. 56 Nersessian, supra note 5 at 236 57 See Greenawalt, supra note 51 at 2264. Here the author states "As regards the question of intent, the prevailing interpretation assumes that genocide is a crime of specific or special intent, involving a perpetrator who specifically targets victims on the basis of their group identity with a deliberate desire to inflict destruction upon the group itself." 58 In Prosecutor v. Kambanda, the ICTR Trial chamber stated that "The Crime of genocide is unique because of its element of dolus specialis (special intent)." Similarly, in the closing paragraph of the judgment of Prosecutor v. Jelisic, the ICTY Trial chamber concluded that "it has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused was motivated by the dolus specialis of the crime of genocide." 59 See van der Vyver, supra note 7, at 308 60 Id aware" and "will occur"), but not dolus eventualis. 61 This alternative approach is referred to as a "knowledge-based intent standard" and holds a broader definition of intent since more than one type of mental state can satisfy its requirements.
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On its face, it still holds true to the generally understood view of genocide as a "targeted crime," but instead relies a slightly different view of "intent" that corresponds more closely to the concept of dolus indirectus, since knowledge of the goal or consequences of a course of action alone would adequately satisfy this requirement.
A knowledge-based interpretation of intent does not seem to have been applied in practice, however. In addition to being frowned upon in practice by tribunal chambers, the knowledge-based standard also certainly has its detractors among analysts and theorists. One scholar states:
"[Some have] argued that the requirement of genocidal intent should include… cases where mens rea takes on the form of dolus indirectus. Since special intent is an essential element of genocide and special intent will always require a certain manifestation of dolus directus, this proposed transformation of genocidal intent is way out of line. Destruction of the group will always be the primary objective of the principal perpetrator while dolus indirectus applies to secondary consequences beyond those actually desired by the perpetrator." As repeatedly held by courts and scholars the most logical and most used interpretation of genocidal intent corresponds mens rea with a concept of dolus directus because dolus indirectus or any lesser intent requirement are simply too broad in scope. Since genocide is a crime that is so severely punishable and requires a special form of intent, it necessitates a mens rea component that is as direct and focused as possible. Otherwise, mens rea becomes too broad and invites the 61 When attempting to convict defendants in positions of authority, this latter form is useful since direct evidence that a commander actually ordered those under his authority to commit crimes is not always available. 85 Therefore, Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute is especially valuable in many criminal proceedings and gains increased importance the higher up the command chain an accused operated. Not surprisingly, Command Responsibility is a doctrine that has had an important history in international law dating back even to the Nuremberg trials. 86 However, with the emergence of genocide as its own distinct crime -and one that involves a stringent mens rea requirement at that -the doctrine of command responsibility creates some theoretical conflicts.
Command Responsibility as illuminated in ICTY cases has three provisions. They are:
1. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship of effective control; 2. the existence of the requisite mens rea, namely the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; 3. the commander failed to follow the necessary course of action to prevent or punish the offense committed. 87 The relevant mens rea standard, therefore, is delineated with the wording "knew or had reason to know." This means that superior liability under Article 7(3) involves a knowledge-based intent standard. This is perfectly acceptable when using 7(3) liability to incriminate an accused of any crime committed that has that same standard or a broader one, which conspicuously should leave out the crime of persecution under crimes against humanity, as well as the crime of genocide. Both of which have a direct intent standard that should logically not be proven with any more generalized standard, as discussed previously. There is simply a fundamental problem in trying to "it is necessary to recall that criminal intent is the moral element required for any crime and that, where the objective is to ascertain the individual criminal responsibility of a person accused of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Chamber… it is certainly proper to ensure that there has been malicious intent, or at least, ensure that negligence was so serious as to be tantamount to acquiescence or even malicious intent."
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In response, Zahar states, "The Chamber concluded that this criminal intent is necessary also for command responsibility. But this is misleading. Command responsibility is not itself a crime. It is a form of individual criminal liability, a mode of participation in a crime that does not involve commission, presence, or even support for the crime. The crime is committed by subordinates; the alleged superior becomes associated with it (and responsible for it) if the elements [of the charged crimes] are fulfilled, including the knowledge element (but not, as asserted above, "malicious intent or its equivalent)." Matters are further confounded if an accused acted, in the words of the Akayesu chamber, with "negligence… so serious as to be tantamount to acquiescence." Most likely in that situation, a perpetrator would be acting with a mens rea that corresponds to mere "negligence" or possibly "knowledge" -neither of which could reasonably satisfy the mens rea to derelict his duty -and thus on purpose -he would have acted with a purposeful intent, and thus could be responsible for genocide, but not as a superior under article 7(3)/6(3). 92 In that case he would have acted actively and purposefully to assist in the commission of genocide, and thus could incur individual liability under Article 7(1)/6(1) for genocide under one of its subheadings, most likely "aiding and abetting" genocide or "complicity" in genocide.
The ICTR further confuses matters by charging accused for genocide both under Article 6(1) and Article 6(3).
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ICTY indictments commonly engage in this practice as well. 94 This approach is problematic in genocide cases that place extreme importance on intent standards because, as noted earlier, direct liability and command responsibility liability involve different mens rea elements. If an accused is indicted for a count of a genocide that happened on or about a specific date and in a specific location, he was either directly involved in the commission of said crime or was indirectly grabbing a fistful of darts, lobbing them all at a dartboard, in hopes that at least something will stick. Realistically, it is not an unexpected strategy since no prosecutor would want to discount any chance she has at winning a case. Convictions bring worldwide recognition to the tribunal and also increased praise for placing blame on an individual for the crimes that occurred in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. A results-oriented attitude like this makes even more sense given the UN's completion schedule that puts a deadline on all tribunal work. 98 A conviction for "genocide" signals to the world that something concrete has been accomplished. Since the ad hoc Tribunals, as functionaries of the UN, are political bodies as well as legal ones, any good public show of approval is definitely an important interest of the tribunal.
However, an overly conviction-hungry practice, for whatever reason it is favored by a prosecutorial team, too-often compromises the ability for accused to know what they are charged with and why, and this certainly violates the "rule of lenity" and fundamental fairness to defendants valued in true criminal trials.
As much as misapplication of the Command Responsibility doctrine in genocide cases may lead to flawed trials and judgments, it is not the only possible jurisprudential incongruity that may scar tribunal work. With the potential for sweeping culpability associations, the theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) can be an effective tool for prosecutors to bring criminals to justice. In the forty-two indictments filed between 25 June 2001 99 and 1 January 2004, a full twentyseven "rely explicitly on JCE" 100 and seven more refer to it implicitly. 101 This means that 81% of confirmed indictments 102 during that time period rely on this doctrine.
So, like Command Responsibility, JCE is an important legal tool that helps incriminate those that may not have directly committed crimes. If there has been an establishment of some sort of concrete agreement between parties to commit wrongdoings, JCE allows for all perpetrators who were a part of this "common criminal plan" to be held responsible for the actions of others participating in the plan whether or not all the wrongdoings were desired by all involved. As ICTY Associate Legal Officer Tilman Blumenstock summarizes, to apply JCE, "There must be a plurality of persons, with responsibility arising if one of them takes action in furtherance of a common design, plan, or purpose, be it through direct or indirect assistance. The understanding or agreement between the members of a 'joint criminal enterprise' need not be express, and… the accused does not necessarily need to have intended the concrete criminal result… [it may suffice] that he or she was simply aware that a certain result was a possible consequence of the execution of the enterprise." 103 As such, JCE can take the form of one of three categories:
1.) JCE Category One: All of the participants in the joint criminal enterprise, acting in furtherance of a common plan, possessed the same criminal intention. An example would be where a group develops a plan to forcibly remove a number of people from an area, and although each member of the group may carry out a different role, each has the same intent to remove that segment of a population from an area. 2.) JCE Category Two: All of the participants in the joint criminal enterprise were members of military or administrative groups acting pursuant to a common plan, where the accused held a position of authority within the command structure; although, he did not physically commit any of the crimes charged, he actively participated in enforcing the common plan by aiding and abetting the other participants in the joint criminal enterprise who did commit them. A telling example would be that of a concentration camp where prisoners are subjected to inhumane treatment pursuant to the joint criminal enterprise. 3.) JCE Category Three: All of the participants were parties to a common plan to pursue one course of action, where one of the persons carrying out the agreed plan also commits a crime which, while outside of the scope of the common plan, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of executing the common plan. An example would be where a group develops a plan to forcibly remove a number of people from an area, and with the result that, in the course of said action one or some of those being removed is killed.
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A prevailing concept with JCE, therefore, is culpability based on a general group-oriented intent. A group of people agrees to the same plan and acts collectively to further it. Not every person involved has to participate in every aspect of the common plan, or even know about every part of the plan as it is being carried out. 105 In regards to JCE's application to genocide cases, which tend to involve hundreds of people, both perpetrators and victims, this is facially useful because it would be near impossible for a prosecutor to be able to prove that any accused had specific knowledge of every person operating within any sort of criminal organization involved in genocide. In fact, it is even questionable whether that kind of knowledge could ever be possible. When dealing with a conflict that involved thousands of people and hundreds of criminal acts over hundreds of square miles -often times with criminal acts happening on different sides of a country or even in different countries all together, as was the case with the Yugoslav conflict of the 1990's, it would be extremely implausible that anyone would be able to have detailed knowledge of all of the possible criminal actions of those operating around him. Just as commanders cannot be expected to have explicit information regarding the actions of all members of the chain of command under them, members of JCE's are subject to the same lenience regarding co-actors.
Ideally, at least in JCE categories I and II, all members of a JCE will share the same criminal intent. Therefore, if the shared and agreed upon intent of the JCE is genocidal, all members of the JCE will rightly have the required mens rea for the crime of genocide and can be convicted for that crime. For those types of circumstances, prosecutors could appropriately file a charge of aiding and abetting genocide, planning genocide, or conspiracy to commit genocide. But that begs an important question: since those three charges, and arguably others that could involve a JCE, can still be put forth without alleging a JCE, what is the point of such a doctrine? JCE is not mentioned anywhere in any tribunal statute, and has therefore basically arisen due to judicial fiat and used in trials by prosecutors. There is an inherent flaw with this, too: judicial fiat is a purely common-law concept -continental law countries pay no attention to legal precedents, and the ad hoc tribunals are composed of common law and continental law judges and lawyers. Tribunal actors from continental law countries may be reluctant to use such an ill-defined, un-tested principle. Additionally, in the common lawcontinental law debate, who is to say which side is "better" or "right" about the use of precedent? It very well may be that a continental law approach is more appropriate for international criminal trials than a common law approach due to the increased ease of fostering truth-telling and victim reconciliation, which would mean that a heavy reliance on a notion derived purely from fiat may be inappropriate. Furthermore, the issue remains that the use of a doctrine by a prosecutor for some sort of crime does not inherently make that such use correct. As shown supra in the case of command responsibility, not all prosecutorial tactics are well-reasoned, well-supported, or even logically sound.
In fact, I argue that JCE is one instance where a doctrine has been misapplied to the crime of genocide. JCE involves three distinct categories, and in each doctrine fails when applied to genocide. The first failure is evident in a JCE category I case where all participants had the same intent. From the outset, this scenario is suspect since it may very well be impossible to ever find a situation where all of the members of an alleged JCE shared exactly the same intent, let alone prove it in trial. However, I will continue in a hypothetical to illustrate that even in the most genocide-friendly scenario, JCE is problematic. If it were determined that such a JCE perpetrated genocide, all the members, who share the same intent, would rightfully hold a genocidal intent, and any member of this type of JCE would pass the mens rea requirement of genocide. However, JCE is premised on the fact that not all members of the collective need to act in furtherance of the plan in the same way. It may very well be that even though there was a JCE, only a portion of the members actually committed any genocidal acts. The remaining portion would merely have held the intent to do so and lacked the required actus reus. Some of this partition may have aided and abetted, planned, or conspired to commit genocide, but as far as strict individual liability is concerned, they did not actually commit genocide. As such, they could not be rightly brought up under individual commission of genocide due to their specific participation in a JCE alone.
The individuals that were merely part of the JCE and shared the same intent but did not act in any way that contributed to the genocide, would only be guilty of having a genocidal mens rea, which is not a crime. Persons can be convicted for some crimes by holding the requisite actus reus of that crime but no criminal mens rea -a crime like involuntary manslaughter is an example of this principle -but in the case of genocide, even this is not possible.
Moreover, no one can be punished for his thoughts alone. Until those thoughts manifest themselves into a criminal action, such a thinker is an innocent man, criminally speaking. Thoughts need to produce action for criminality to occur and it is common sense that no one should be taken to trial for a crime that was not even committed.
JCE category II is very similar to category I and has the same pitfalls, but involves a military construct. It is when examining JCE category II that bigger holes in the application of the JCE doctrine to genocide are visible. As illustrated supra, any kind of a JCE can run the risk of removing the actus reus from the genocidal equation. However, JCE III, the most extended form of a JCE, further leaves the door open for the removal of even the mens rea aspect of the crime. In this form of JCE, the members agree to a certain plan of action, but some members act outside of the intended plan. Two situations can therefore arise when using this part of the doctrine to affix culpability. First, a JCE could exist where all members shared a genocidal intent but did not actually commit directly or plan, aide, or abet any genocidal acts.
As delineated above, the members of the JCE would be innocent of genocide because, while the mens rea requirement was met, the actus reus requirement was not. If a person in the JCE then acted outside the scope of the rest of the JCE and committed the genocidal act, thus creating a JCE category III association, the individuals alone would be responsible for genocide (assuming they still possessed the requisite intent), not the entire JCE. The JCE doctrine as it is treated now still leaves open the possibility that courts would convict the other participants of such a JCE, even though they would be legally innocent. If it could be shown that those other members did anything to facilitate the rogue member that acted outside of the JCE's scope, then not only would a JCE III relationship not truly exist, the whole JCE doctrine would not be necessary because those individuals would be guilty of aiding and abetting or planning in their own right, regardless of their association with any criminal enterprise.
Second, a JCE could exist where the members do not share a genocidal mens rea and a member acts outside of the scope of the JCE and commits a genocidal act with genocidal intent. A JCE category III situation would also be formed in this case and the nonconforming member would be individually culpable of genocide. If the JCE doctrine were to be applied here though, all of the members of the JCE could be brought up on genocide charges for the actions of the one member who acted outside, unrelated to, and perhaps even contrary to the enterprise in place. This is problematic not only because the members of the JCE would lack the actus reus requirement, but would also lack a genocidal mens rea.
Genocide is a crime that has two requirements, and by applying JCE category III culpability, persons could be brought up on charges without meeting any of the requirements of the crime. Persons who did not commit genocide, nor ever intended to, could suddenly find themselves charged with the crime simply because they were in a low-level criminal organization and happened to have ties to a maverick genocidal perpetrator. This would be guilt by association -the scourge of any legal system -realized in the application of possibly the most serious crime punishable by any law.
JCE is fundamentally premised on culpability arising not from committing a crime, but on a relationship with someone who did commit a crime unrelated to anyone else's intent or crimes. JCE's are nebulous criminal associations that can take the form of a civilian group, a military group (JCE II), or even a governmental organization (as is the case with the highest Serbian leaders now on trial at the ICTY). Applying the JCE doctrine to genocide no only allows for the removal of an actus reus, but also the requisite mens rea, and in doing so completely undermines all that the crime stands for and was designed by Raphael Lemkin to combat. JCE can allow for individuals to be guilty of the "crime of crimes"
simply by being in the wrong place at the wrong time and having an awareness of one wrong person.
If taken logically through to the extremes of its reach, JCE category III can have an alarmingly broad scope. If, for example, one genocidal perpetrator existed in a military construct, and that military was corrupt enough to be considered a criminal enterprise because it perhaps killed a few civilians and stole some property in an occupied town, there is nothing to stop the entire military regime of now being culpable through JCE of the one lone genocidal genocide as a destructive, intentional crime. The doctrine also runs the risk of undermining the fairness and justness of the ad hoc tribunals -and can effectively denigrate the "crime of crimes" to a meaningless buzzword that can be thrown around to any defendant at will as long as that defendant fell in with the wrong crowd, or was part of any organization, including a government or military.
The application of JCE is made all the more important because of its prominent role in the major criminal trials coming out of the ad hoc tribunals. For years to come, the international community will remember the cases against Milosevic, Krstic, Jelisic, and Krajisnic and will remember how these courts addressed the crime of genocide and the doctrines of Command Responsibility and Joint Criminal Enterprise. In particular, JCE is a dangerous doctrine that can undermine how the ad hoc tribunal verdicts are received not only by future courts, but by the victims, witnesses, and perpetrators of the unspeakable atrocities that occurred in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In fact, much of how the ICTY in particular will be judge by future courts and legal scholars will be in how well it reconciles the interests of convicting criminals with the need to put forth soundly reasoned opinions that will stand the test of time and speak to the fairness and the justice of the ad hoc tribunal process. For, as the Honorable Judge Theodore Meron, President of the ICTY, stated, "The revolution of international criminal law is quite spectacular, but it is still in progress."
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What is certain for now is that a strict handling of the genocide statutes and JCE and a close watch over the fundamental principles of such legal concepts is necessary. To this end, some have already argued that "the role of a strict standard is to prevent doctrinal expansion along a slippery slope that destroys the particular focus of the prohibition against genocide by converting almost every act of large-scale destruction into a form of genocide." 117 Genocide was never intended to be used recklessly, and it is a crime that carries so much weight that it must be treated with the utmost care and sensitivity. And in order for any of the jurisprudence from the ad hoc tribunals to last, courts must find better ways to uphold the letter and the spirit of the laws outlawing genocide without compromising rulings with reasoning based on problematic culpability associations. All courts are involved in balancing competing interests. Finding a proper balance between the need to convict with and the need to uphold the principles of individual criminal responsibility and trial fairness becomes even more important when the whole world is watching.
